texts like the Daodejing or Zhuangzi. I follow Graham in thinking that the "antirationalism" of both is motivated to a great extent by the development of linguistic paradoxes by earlier thinkers. How can language and argumentation be reliable guides when one can persuasively argue that "a white horse is not a horse"?
Issues of coverage aside, the first significant error in this book occurs on the third page, where the author writes,
The earliest form of divination that we now know of was the method of tortoiseshell reading. To perform this divination, some encrypted words were first written on a tortoise-shell. (These writings were the earliest writing samples found in China, dating back to 1700-1100 BCE.) The shell was then put into a fire until it started to crack at various points. The reader of the sign would decipher the code depending on how those words were separated. (p. 3) There are at least four things wrong here. (1) I am not sure what the author means by saying that the words were "encrypted. " The inscriptions are very hard for us to read today, but that is because the characters and the grammar differ so much from classical Chinese. The expressions were being written in a ritual context, so they presumably used stylized locutions, but this is not encryption either. (2) Some words may have been written on a given shell prior to divination, but this was not a general rule.
(If anything was inscribed prior to divination, it was merely the preface, giving the time of divination and name of the diviner. And we have discovered some shells that
show no inscriptions at all [p. 3]). We do not have any inscribed oracle bones dating back to 1700 BCE, and we have some that date from after 1100 BCE. (I suspect that the author simply inserted the approximate dates of the Shang dynasty.) (4) The notion that the shells were interpreted according to how the words written on the shell were separated by the cracks is nothing better than "tea-house Sinology. "
We all make mistakes. No one can stay current on every issue that is relevant to one's topic. The problem is that the above is representative of errors that occur in each chapter of the book. I will list a few more examples. The author announces that "[b]efore paper was invented in China (in the first century AD), books had to be carved onto bamboo plates, which were then assembled with the aid of ropes" (p. 12). But one can easily consult reference works that show photographs of excavated bamboo strips (not "plates") on which text was written in ink (not "carved").
Furthermore, writing was also done on silk from a fairly early period.
The author declares that, with Mencius, "we witness the beginning of philosophical argumentation in Chinese philosophy" (p. 84). There is debate over whether Confucius can be described as philosophical. Obviously, this depends on what one means by "philosophy. " But analytic philosophers are often inclined to deny the designation to Confucius because of the paucity of explicit arguments in the Analects. So it is at least a defensible view that Confucius does not argue philosophically. However, the author's own discussion of the Mohists makes clear that it is erroneous to suggest that philosophical argumentation begins with Mencius.
The author asserts that "even though Mozi's ultimate goal was the overall benefit of the world, he understood that everyone is intrinsically a self-interested creature" (p. 114). This interpretation is implausible, and the author cites no textual evidence in support of it. She seems to be implicitly assimilating the Mohists to the Western philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, for whom the source of human conflict is our natural egoism. However, at the opening of "Obeying One's Superior, " when Mozi describes what Western philosophers would call the "state of nature" (that is, the human condition prior to government and civilization), he stresses the conflict that will result from humans having different conceptions of yi "righteousness"-not from innate self-interest.
The author also claims that "even though Mozi's fundamental doctrine is based on a belief in mutual benefits, throughout his entire book there is not a single chapter devoted to the argument for the importance of mutual benefits" (p. 127). Actually, "Impartial Caring" is devoted to this topic. the point is that the text presents itself as giving a precise "analytic" approach, but this is just the kind of mistake that an analytic philosopher would not make.
Criticizing the interpretation given by Herbert Fingarette, the author writes that "textual evidence shows that Confucius does not interpret li [ritual] to consist merely of formal ceremonies, and he does not think that morality simply lies in observing the rites" (p. 59). I am critical of many aspects of Fingarette's interpretation myself, but he specifically denies that rituals are "merely" formal ceremonies for
Confucius. And he would certainly deny that our obligations are exhausted by "sim- But if they're given with contempt, then even a homeless person will not accept them. If they're trampled upon, then even a beggar won't take them. " It is plausible to read the beggar stories of 6A10 as providing an illustration of the sprout of righteousness mentioned in 2A6. It is a virtue of Liu's account that she sees this (p. 75), but her own logical paraphrase of the passage obscures it. She writes, The first problem with this paraphrase is that, when the author quotes 6A10, she leaves out the sentences about the beggars that I cited above, so the unwary reader will think the second sentence in her premise 1 is gratuitous.
It looks like the author thinks that Mencius has two conclusions here The really regrettable fact is that Liu is very close to making an insightful and important point. Mencius does state the generalization that any human would refuse handouts given with contempt, even if he were on the brink of starva- Again, it may seem that I am being overly demanding of Liu's exegesis.
But this illustrates a general problem with her approach. On the one hand, if one really is a serious analytic philosopher, one will find her approach careless.
Analytic philosophers are, after all, the ones who stress "the formulation of arguments" and "the pursuit of clarity in language" (p. ix). On the other hand, scholars whose methodologies do not emphasize these things will find distorting or irrelevant her emphasis upon argument and analysis.
The second half of the book, which discusses Chinese Buddhism, seems stronger to me than the first half. Even here, though, I had concerns. The author contrasts Consciousness-Only Buddhism with Hua-yan by saying that the former is a form of "objective idealism, " while the latter is a version of "subjective idealism" (pp. 255-256). These terms are drawn from the Western tradition, in which Hegel is the paradigmatic objective idealist and Berkeley is the paradigmatic subjective idealist. Consciousness-Only Buddhism is certainly some kind of idealism, but one has to be very careful in invoking a term that might encourage comparison with Hegel's notion that "the real is the rational and the rational is the real. " Similarly, Hua-yan Buddhists do say some things that sound like subjective idealism. However, the Hua-yan patriarch Fa-zang's example of the golden lion suggests something quite different from Berkeley's notion that "to be is to be perceived. " The gold of the statue really is there, independent of any subjective consciousness; it is only our seeing it as a lion that is, in some way, a mental So what went wrong? On the one hand, authors have to resist the pressure to publish too soon. Good undergraduate lecture notes (especially those written under a heavy teaching load) do not convert easily into a solid textbook. On the other hand, publishers have to do their job. An editor has to find not only responsible referees but also take their reports seriously. If reports call for substantial revisions, the publisher has to make sure they are completed prior to sending a manuscript to press. To state the obvious: philosophizing is hard; philosophizing about texts from another millennium that are written in another language is harder still. So we should approach our task in the spirit of Confucius's disciple Yan Yuan:
The more I look up at it, the higher it seems; the more I delve into it, the harder it becomes. Catching a glimpse of it before me, I then find it suddenly at my back. 
